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- docs/agents/domain.md: add the four ADRs missing from the directory diagram (009-disable-get-fallback-by-default, 010-cli-terminal-control-sanitization, 011-max-content-runes-cli-only, 012-close-cancels-inflight-searches) so agents exploring the repo can discover every accepted decision. - docs/adr/007-no-dns-rebinding.md: add a top-of-file cross-reference noting that ADR-008 (Same-Hostname-Only Redirect Policy) supersedes the redirect aspect of this decision, and update the Context and Rationale to drop the stale claim that `isPrivateHost()` drives the redirect check. `isPrivateHost()` is now only used for the non-private-host HTTP warning (ADR-003), matching the implementation in `internal/searxng/searcher.go` and the redirect policy in `internal/searxng/client.go` (`enforceSearchRedirectPolicy`). Closes #145 Closes #147
39 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
39 lines
2.1 KiB
Markdown
# ADR-007: No DNS Rebinding Protection in SSRF Defense
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**Status:** Accepted (redirect policy superseded by ADR-008)
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**Date:** 2026-04-28
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> **Note:** The redirect SSRF defense described in the Context and Rationale
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> below was further refined by
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> [ADR-008: Same-Hostname-Only Redirect Policy](008-same-hostname-redirect.md),
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> which replaced the `isPrivateHost()`-based redirect check with a
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> hostname-and-scheme comparison. `isPrivateHost()` is no longer used for
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> redirect decisions; it is retained for the HTTP warning described in
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> ADR-003. The DNS-rebinding decision itself is unchanged and remains in
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> force.
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## Context
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The redirect SSRF defense in `newHTTPClient` (`internal/searxng/client.go`)
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controls which redirects are followed at the HTTP transport layer.
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One potential attack vector is DNS rebinding: a hostname initially resolves
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to a public IP, then after the host check passes, rebinds to a private IP
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during the actual TCP dial.
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## Decision
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**We will NOT implement DNS rebinding protection** (i.e., a custom `DialContext` that re-checks the resolved IP before connecting).
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## Rationale
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1. **Threat model mismatch:** The primary threat is a compromised or misconfigured SearXNG instance redirecting to internal hosts. DNS rebinding requires an attacker to control both the DNS and the redirect target simultaneously — a significantly higher bar.
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2. **Over-engineering:** Adding a `DialContext` IP check introduces complexity (custom dialer, dual resolution, TOCTOU edge cases) for a scenario that is both unlikely and already mitigated at the application layer (SearXNG runs on trusted infrastructure).
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3. **Existing mitigations suffice:** The redirect policy (see ADR-008 for the
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current implementation) and the `isPrivateHost()` check that drives the
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HTTP non-private-host warning (ADR-003) cover the realistic attack surface
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without adding custom DNS resolution logic.
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## Consequences
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- Redirect defense remains host-based only.
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- If a future deployment model exposes the MCP server to untrusted SearXNG instances with attacker-controlled DNS, this decision should be revisited.
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