searxng-mcp-go/docs/adr/007-no-dns-rebinding.md
opencode-agent[bot] 6416e41140 docs: refresh ADR listing and clarify ADR-007 redirect policy
- docs/agents/domain.md: add the four ADRs missing from the directory
  diagram (009-disable-get-fallback-by-default,
  010-cli-terminal-control-sanitization, 011-max-content-runes-cli-only,
  012-close-cancels-inflight-searches) so agents exploring the repo can
  discover every accepted decision.

- docs/adr/007-no-dns-rebinding.md: add a top-of-file cross-reference
  noting that ADR-008 (Same-Hostname-Only Redirect Policy) supersedes
  the redirect aspect of this decision, and update the Context and
  Rationale to drop the stale claim that `isPrivateHost()` drives the
  redirect check. `isPrivateHost()` is now only used for the
  non-private-host HTTP warning (ADR-003), matching the implementation
  in `internal/searxng/searcher.go` and the redirect policy in
  `internal/searxng/client.go` (`enforceSearchRedirectPolicy`).

Closes #145
Closes #147
2026-06-08 05:01:56 +00:00

2.1 KiB

ADR-007: No DNS Rebinding Protection in SSRF Defense

Status: Accepted (redirect policy superseded by ADR-008)
Date: 2026-04-28

Note: The redirect SSRF defense described in the Context and Rationale below was further refined by ADR-008: Same-Hostname-Only Redirect Policy, which replaced the isPrivateHost()-based redirect check with a hostname-and-scheme comparison. isPrivateHost() is no longer used for redirect decisions; it is retained for the HTTP warning described in ADR-003. The DNS-rebinding decision itself is unchanged and remains in force.

Context

The redirect SSRF defense in newHTTPClient (internal/searxng/client.go) controls which redirects are followed at the HTTP transport layer. One potential attack vector is DNS rebinding: a hostname initially resolves to a public IP, then after the host check passes, rebinds to a private IP during the actual TCP dial.

Decision

We will NOT implement DNS rebinding protection (i.e., a custom DialContext that re-checks the resolved IP before connecting).

Rationale

  1. Threat model mismatch: The primary threat is a compromised or misconfigured SearXNG instance redirecting to internal hosts. DNS rebinding requires an attacker to control both the DNS and the redirect target simultaneously — a significantly higher bar.
  2. Over-engineering: Adding a DialContext IP check introduces complexity (custom dialer, dual resolution, TOCTOU edge cases) for a scenario that is both unlikely and already mitigated at the application layer (SearXNG runs on trusted infrastructure).
  3. Existing mitigations suffice: The redirect policy (see ADR-008 for the current implementation) and the isPrivateHost() check that drives the HTTP non-private-host warning (ADR-003) cover the realistic attack surface without adding custom DNS resolution logic.

Consequences

  • Redirect defense remains host-based only.
  • If a future deployment model exposes the MCP server to untrusted SearXNG instances with attacker-controlled DNS, this decision should be revisited.