- docs/agents/domain.md: add the four ADRs missing from the directory diagram (009-disable-get-fallback-by-default, 010-cli-terminal-control-sanitization, 011-max-content-runes-cli-only, 012-close-cancels-inflight-searches) so agents exploring the repo can discover every accepted decision. - docs/adr/007-no-dns-rebinding.md: add a top-of-file cross-reference noting that ADR-008 (Same-Hostname-Only Redirect Policy) supersedes the redirect aspect of this decision, and update the Context and Rationale to drop the stale claim that `isPrivateHost()` drives the redirect check. `isPrivateHost()` is now only used for the non-private-host HTTP warning (ADR-003), matching the implementation in `internal/searxng/searcher.go` and the redirect policy in `internal/searxng/client.go` (`enforceSearchRedirectPolicy`). Closes #145 Closes #147
2.1 KiB
ADR-007: No DNS Rebinding Protection in SSRF Defense
Status: Accepted (redirect policy superseded by ADR-008)
Date: 2026-04-28
Note: The redirect SSRF defense described in the Context and Rationale below was further refined by ADR-008: Same-Hostname-Only Redirect Policy, which replaced the
isPrivateHost()-based redirect check with a hostname-and-scheme comparison.isPrivateHost()is no longer used for redirect decisions; it is retained for the HTTP warning described in ADR-003. The DNS-rebinding decision itself is unchanged and remains in force.
Context
The redirect SSRF defense in newHTTPClient (internal/searxng/client.go)
controls which redirects are followed at the HTTP transport layer.
One potential attack vector is DNS rebinding: a hostname initially resolves
to a public IP, then after the host check passes, rebinds to a private IP
during the actual TCP dial.
Decision
We will NOT implement DNS rebinding protection (i.e., a custom DialContext that re-checks the resolved IP before connecting).
Rationale
- Threat model mismatch: The primary threat is a compromised or misconfigured SearXNG instance redirecting to internal hosts. DNS rebinding requires an attacker to control both the DNS and the redirect target simultaneously — a significantly higher bar.
- Over-engineering: Adding a
DialContextIP check introduces complexity (custom dialer, dual resolution, TOCTOU edge cases) for a scenario that is both unlikely and already mitigated at the application layer (SearXNG runs on trusted infrastructure). - Existing mitigations suffice: The redirect policy (see ADR-008 for the
current implementation) and the
isPrivateHost()check that drives the HTTP non-private-host warning (ADR-003) cover the realistic attack surface without adding custom DNS resolution logic.
Consequences
- Redirect defense remains host-based only.
- If a future deployment model exposes the MCP server to untrusted SearXNG instances with attacker-controlled DNS, this decision should be revisited.