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122 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
122 lines
5.6 KiB
Markdown
---
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title: Passwords & Logins
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description: The agent signs into sites, pays and fills addresses for you without ever seeing a password.
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---
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# Passwords & Logins
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Say **"log into GitHub"** and the agent signs in for you. The first time it
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reaches a sign-in page it has no login for, it asks you, right there, in a
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masked prompt. After that it just works. Passwords are encrypted on this
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machine and injected straight into the page; the model never sees them.
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There is nothing to set up.
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## What it looks like
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**CLI / TUI**
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```
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🔐 Save login for github.com
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The agent reached a sign-in page with no saved login for this site.
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Type the email / username you sign in with (shown), then Enter.
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...
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Now the password (hidden). It is encrypted on this machine, bound to
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https://github.com, and filled into the page without the model ever seeing it.
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```
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**Desktop** — a "Save your github.com login?" card with an identifier field and
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a masked password field. *Save & sign in* stores it and continues; *Don't save*
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tells the agent to stop asking for this turn.
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From then on the agent lists your saved logins, types the identifier itself and
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fills the password through Hermes. The tool result it sees is
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`{filled_fields: 1, origin: "https://github.com"}`; the password is also
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registered with the redactor so a later page read cannot echo it back.
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## Two-factor codes
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Sites that ask for a code after the password are handled the same way:
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- **Authenticator key saved with the login** (the "setup key" or `otpauth://`
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link a site shows when you enable 2FA; 1Password and Bitwarden items that
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hold a TOTP seed count too): Hermes generates the current code and enters
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it. Nobody is asked. Add the key in **Settings → Passwords & Logins → Add**
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or `hermes vault add`; the item shows a *2FA auto* badge.
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- **Code sent to your phone or email**: a small prompt appears in your
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surface ("Verification code for github.com"), you type the code, Hermes
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enters it into the page. The code never enters the conversation either.
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- **Passkeys, hardware keys, app approvals** ("tap Approve in Duo"): nothing
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to type. The agent tells you to complete it on your device and waits for
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the page to move on.
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## Already using 1Password or Bitwarden?
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Nothing to enable. If the `op` or `bw` command-line tool is installed and signed
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in, Hermes picks it up automatically and its website logins become fillable
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alongside the local ones. The first time the agent needs one of those logins it
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asks you to unlock the manager with your master password (masked prompt; once
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per session, 30 minutes idle). Hermes hands the master password to the manager's
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CLI through its non-interactive channel (`op signin` on stdin, `bw unlock
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--passwordenv` in the child's environment) and keeps only the session token in
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memory. The agent never sees the master password, the token, or any login.
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A manager item that lists several websites (say `amazon.co.uk`,
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`www.amazon.co.uk` and `eu.account.amazon.com`) fills on each of those exact
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origins; nothing is inferred beyond the URLs saved on the item.
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Prefer not to use a detected manager? `hermes vault sources --disable bitwarden`,
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or the switch in **Settings → Passwords & Logins**.
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## Paying and filling addresses
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Cards and addresses work the same way as logins: saved once (**Settings →
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Passwords & Logins → Add**, or `hermes vault add`), bound to the checkout site,
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and filled by the agent on that site only. **Every card fill asks you first**,
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with the same approval prompt as a dangerous command; declining writes nothing.
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Headless sessions (cron, webhooks, the API server) cannot confirm and are
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refused, so a prompt injection that reaches a checkout page can ask, but it
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cannot spend. Address fills need no confirmation.
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## Managing what's saved
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- **Desktop → Settings → Passwords & Logins**: everything saved, the detected
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password managers with Unlock/Lock, Add, Remove.
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- **CLI**: `hermes vault list`, `hermes vault add`, `hermes vault rm <handle>`,
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`hermes vault sources`.
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Items live encrypted under `~/.hermes/vault/` (Fernet key + vault file, both
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`0600`), scoped to the profile. Labels, site origins and login identifiers are
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visible metadata; passwords and card values never leave the vault except into
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the page.
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## Headless sessions
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Cron jobs, webhooks, the API server and `hermes chat -q` have nobody to answer a
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prompt. Saved local logins keep working there; a locked password manager reports
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`unavailable_in_this_session` and a missing login reports `prompt_unavailable`.
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Unlock or save from an interactive session first, or give 1Password a service
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account token (`OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN`).
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```yaml
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vault:
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onepassword:
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enabled: false # opt OUT of a detected manager (default: on when installed)
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account: "" # `op --account` shorthand; empty = default
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service_account_token_env: OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN
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bitwarden:
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enabled: false
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```
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## What this does and does not guarantee
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**Does:** the password never enters the model's context through Hermes: not in
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tool results, logs, the session database, or the CLI arguments of any process.
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Fills happen over the supervised browser session's direct CDP socket and are
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refused unless the page origin exactly matches the saved origin, checked again
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inside the page immediately before the write.
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**Does not:** protect against the page itself. Once a password is typed into a
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site, that site (and any script it runs) has it, exactly as when you type it
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yourself. On a cloud browser backend the vendor's browser sees the page like any
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other. The origin binding is the guard against filling on the wrong site, not
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against a compromised right one.
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