mirror of
https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent.git
synced 2026-11-16 19:36:54 +00:00
#116727 recognised Deno's bare `eval` subcommand only as args[0]. Deno's CLI is `deno [OPTIONS] [COMMAND]`, so any global option before the subcommand — `deno -q eval "..."`, `deno --quiet eval`, `deno -L debug eval`, `deno --log-level=debug eval` — made the scan stop at the positional `eval` and the inline script ran without approval, while `node --no-warnings -e` was still caught. Verified against deno 2.9.6: each of those forms executes the script; `deno -- eval` opens the REPL and stays unflagged. Treat the FIRST positional token after the option scan as the exec marker (the existing loop already skips options and their values), and register `-L/--log-level` as Deno's one value-taking global so `-L debug eval` is not mistaken for `deno -L debug` + a data token. `deno run eval.ts` stays data. Follow-up to #116727 (independent review finding).
65 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
65 lines
3.4 KiB
Python
"""Bun and Deno evaluate inline scripts through forms the interpreter flag
|
|
tables did not know: ``bun -e/--eval``, and Deno's bare ``eval`` subcommand
|
|
(``deno eval "code"``). They must reach the same approval classification as
|
|
``node -e`` / ``python -c``. See issue #116012.
|
|
"""
|
|
|
|
import pytest
|
|
|
|
from tools.approval import detect_dangerous_command
|
|
|
|
|
|
class TestBunDenoInlineScriptExecution:
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"cmd, expected_key",
|
|
[
|
|
('bun -e "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('bun --eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno -e "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno --eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
# Command-position wrappers must not shield the interpreter.
|
|
('sudo bun -e "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('sudo deno eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
# Deno global options precede the subcommand (`deno [OPTIONS] [COMMAND]`); `-L`
|
|
# takes a separate value. Verified against deno 2.9.6: each of these runs the script.
|
|
('deno -q eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno --quiet eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno -L debug eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno -Ldebug eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('deno --log-level=debug eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
# Windows resolves executable names case-insensitively; `_interpreter_family`
|
|
# lowercases the basename, so BUN.EXE / Deno.exe must be classified too.
|
|
('BUN.EXE -e "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('Deno.exe eval "console.log(1)"', "script execution via -e/-c flag"),
|
|
('bun << "EOF"\nconsole.log("pwned")\nEOF', "script execution via heredoc"),
|
|
("deno << 'EOF'\nconsole.log(\"pwned\")\nEOF", "script execution via heredoc"),
|
|
# An unterminated quote fails closed like the other interpreter families.
|
|
('bun -e "console.log(1)', "command parser limit or malformed executable payload"),
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_inline_eval_classified_like_node_and_python(self, cmd, expected_key):
|
|
dangerous, key, _ = detect_dangerous_command(cmd)
|
|
assert dangerous is True, cmd
|
|
assert key == expected_key, cmd
|
|
|
|
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
|
|
"cmd",
|
|
[
|
|
"bun install",
|
|
"bun run build",
|
|
"deno run server.ts",
|
|
"deno test",
|
|
"deno lint",
|
|
# A file literally named eval.ts is a `run` operand, not the eval subcommand.
|
|
"deno run eval.ts",
|
|
"deno -q run eval.ts",
|
|
"deno -L debug run eval.ts",
|
|
# `deno -- eval` opens the REPL (the subcommand parser stops at `--`); nothing runs.
|
|
'deno -- eval "console.log(1)"',
|
|
# `deno eval` inside quotes is data for echo, not a command position.
|
|
"echo 'use deno eval for that'",
|
|
],
|
|
)
|
|
def test_everyday_bun_deno_invocations_stay_unflagged(self, cmd):
|
|
assert detect_dangerous_command(cmd) == (False, None, None), cmd
|