hermes-agent/tests/pm/test_deb_safety.py
ethernet 6dc1288dd1 refactor(pm): route .deb payloads through the one tar extractor
DebPackage kept its own 116-line member walker next to
pm.store.extract_tar. Both enforced the same containment rules, so the
.deb data.tar now goes through extract_tar (which accepts an open
stream) and FilterError maps to InstallError. Link fallbacks on hosts
without symlink support come from tarfile's own copy fallback, which
also resolves chained aliases. The Termux mode normalization stays in
DebPackage, since it is .deb policy and not extraction.

The per-member FilterError/OSError swallow in pm/packages.py was already
removed; Git's MSYS /proc link exemption is unchanged.
2026-09-24 14:08:21 -04:00

135 lines
4.6 KiB
Python

"""DebPackage.unpack containment regressions (via pm.store.extract_tar).
A safe extractor must forbid ANY write or chmod outside the staged tree.
The malicious .deb fixtures are real ar+tars built in a temp sandbox and
pointed at an outside SENTINEL file/dir inside the sandbox — never real
user or /etc data. Absolute-symlink rejection runs everywhere; the
symlink-privilege-dependent shapes are host-gated because Windows may lack
symlink privilege (validator-checked before the test bodies create links).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import os
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from pm.package import DebPackage, InstallError
from tests.pm._fixtures import _ar_member
class _P(DebPackage):
name = "evil-deb"
def _build_deb(path: Path, members: list[tarfile.TarInfo | tuple[str, bytes]]) -> None:
"""A real ar archive with one data.tar (uncompressed) holding `members`."""
buf = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:
for item in members:
if isinstance(item, tuple):
name, content = item
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
info.size = len(content)
tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))
else:
tf.addfile(item)
path.write_bytes(
b"!<arch>\n"
+ _ar_member("debian-binary", b"2.0\n")
+ _ar_member("data.tar", buf.getvalue())
)
def _symlink_member(name: str, linkname: str) -> tarfile.TarInfo:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
info.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
info.linkname = linkname
info.mode = 0o777
return info
def test_chained_aliases_survive_without_symlink_support(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
def unavailable(*args, **kwargs):
raise OSError("symlinks unavailable")
monkeypatch.setattr(os, "symlink", unavailable)
deb = tmp_path / "aliases.deb"
lib = "data/data/com.termux/files/usr/lib"
_build_deb(deb, [
_symlink_member(f"{lib}/libexample.so", "libexample.so.1"),
_symlink_member(f"{lib}/libexample.so.1", "libexample.so.1.2"),
(f"{lib}/libexample.so.1.2", b"library payload"),
])
staged = tmp_path / "staged"
staged.mkdir()
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
for name in ("libexample.so", "libexample.so.1", "libexample.so.1.2"):
assert (staged / lib / name).read_bytes() == b"library payload"
def test_relative_member_escape_preserves_outside(tmp_path):
deb, staged = tmp_path / "escape.deb", tmp_path / "staged"
sentinel = tmp_path / "sentinel"
sentinel.write_bytes(b"outside")
_build_deb(deb, [("../sentinel", b"escaped")])
staged.mkdir()
with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
assert sentinel.read_bytes() == b"outside"
def test_absolute_symlink_target_rejected(tmp_path: Path):
"""A member whose symlink target is ABSOLUTE must be refused outright:
the link points outside the staged tree the moment it is created."""
deb = tmp_path / "abs-link.deb"
_build_deb(
deb,
[
_symlink_member("data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin/tool", "/etc/shadow"),
],
)
staged = tmp_path / "staged"
staged.mkdir()
with pytest.raises(InstallError):
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
assert not (staged / "data").exists()
@pytest.mark.platforms("posix")
@pytest.mark.parametrize(
"shape",
["relative-link", "planted-ancestor"],
)
def test_symlink_escape_forbidden(tmp_path: Path, shape: str):
"""Relative link and pre-existing ancestor escapes leave outside bytes/mode intact.
These exercise containment, not an independent late chmod-walk guard.
"""
outside = tmp_path / "outside"
outside.mkdir()
sentinel = outside / "sentinel.txt"
sentinel.write_text("do not touch")
os.chmod(sentinel, 0o600)
staged = tmp_path / "staged"
staged.mkdir()
if shape == "relative-link":
members = [_symlink_member("link", "../outside"), ("link/evil.txt", b"escaped")]
else:
(staged / "link").symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)
members = [("link/evil.txt", b"escaped")]
deb = tmp_path / f"escape-{shape}.deb"
_build_deb(deb, members)
with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
assert sentinel.read_text() == "do not touch", (
f"{shape}: a staged symlink was followed outside the tree"
)
assert os.stat(sentinel).st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
assert not (outside / "evil.txt").exists()