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DebPackage kept its own 116-line member walker next to pm.store.extract_tar. Both enforced the same containment rules, so the .deb data.tar now goes through extract_tar (which accepts an open stream) and FilterError maps to InstallError. Link fallbacks on hosts without symlink support come from tarfile's own copy fallback, which also resolves chained aliases. The Termux mode normalization stays in DebPackage, since it is .deb policy and not extraction. The per-member FilterError/OSError swallow in pm/packages.py was already removed; Git's MSYS /proc link exemption is unchanged.
135 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
135 lines
4.6 KiB
Python
"""DebPackage.unpack containment regressions (via pm.store.extract_tar).
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A safe extractor must forbid ANY write or chmod outside the staged tree.
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The malicious .deb fixtures are real ar+tars built in a temp sandbox and
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pointed at an outside SENTINEL file/dir inside the sandbox — never real
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user or /etc data. Absolute-symlink rejection runs everywhere; the
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symlink-privilege-dependent shapes are host-gated because Windows may lack
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symlink privilege (validator-checked before the test bodies create links).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import io
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import os
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import tarfile
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from pathlib import Path
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import pytest
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from pm.package import DebPackage, InstallError
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from tests.pm._fixtures import _ar_member
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class _P(DebPackage):
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name = "evil-deb"
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def _build_deb(path: Path, members: list[tarfile.TarInfo | tuple[str, bytes]]) -> None:
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"""A real ar archive with one data.tar (uncompressed) holding `members`."""
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buf = io.BytesIO()
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with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:
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for item in members:
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if isinstance(item, tuple):
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name, content = item
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info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
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info.size = len(content)
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tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(content))
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else:
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tf.addfile(item)
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path.write_bytes(
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b"!<arch>\n"
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+ _ar_member("debian-binary", b"2.0\n")
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+ _ar_member("data.tar", buf.getvalue())
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)
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def _symlink_member(name: str, linkname: str) -> tarfile.TarInfo:
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info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
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info.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
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info.linkname = linkname
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info.mode = 0o777
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return info
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def test_chained_aliases_survive_without_symlink_support(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
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def unavailable(*args, **kwargs):
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raise OSError("symlinks unavailable")
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monkeypatch.setattr(os, "symlink", unavailable)
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deb = tmp_path / "aliases.deb"
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lib = "data/data/com.termux/files/usr/lib"
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_build_deb(deb, [
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_symlink_member(f"{lib}/libexample.so", "libexample.so.1"),
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_symlink_member(f"{lib}/libexample.so.1", "libexample.so.1.2"),
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(f"{lib}/libexample.so.1.2", b"library payload"),
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])
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staged = tmp_path / "staged"
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staged.mkdir()
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_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
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for name in ("libexample.so", "libexample.so.1", "libexample.so.1.2"):
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assert (staged / lib / name).read_bytes() == b"library payload"
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def test_relative_member_escape_preserves_outside(tmp_path):
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deb, staged = tmp_path / "escape.deb", tmp_path / "staged"
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sentinel = tmp_path / "sentinel"
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sentinel.write_bytes(b"outside")
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_build_deb(deb, [("../sentinel", b"escaped")])
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staged.mkdir()
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with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
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_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
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assert sentinel.read_bytes() == b"outside"
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def test_absolute_symlink_target_rejected(tmp_path: Path):
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"""A member whose symlink target is ABSOLUTE must be refused outright:
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the link points outside the staged tree the moment it is created."""
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deb = tmp_path / "abs-link.deb"
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_build_deb(
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deb,
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[
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_symlink_member("data/data/com.termux/files/usr/bin/tool", "/etc/shadow"),
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],
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)
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staged = tmp_path / "staged"
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staged.mkdir()
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with pytest.raises(InstallError):
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_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
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assert not (staged / "data").exists()
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@pytest.mark.platforms("posix")
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@pytest.mark.parametrize(
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"shape",
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["relative-link", "planted-ancestor"],
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)
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def test_symlink_escape_forbidden(tmp_path: Path, shape: str):
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"""Relative link and pre-existing ancestor escapes leave outside bytes/mode intact.
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These exercise containment, not an independent late chmod-walk guard.
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"""
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outside = tmp_path / "outside"
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outside.mkdir()
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sentinel = outside / "sentinel.txt"
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sentinel.write_text("do not touch")
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os.chmod(sentinel, 0o600)
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staged = tmp_path / "staged"
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staged.mkdir()
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if shape == "relative-link":
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members = [_symlink_member("link", "../outside"), ("link/evil.txt", b"escaped")]
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else:
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(staged / "link").symlink_to(outside, target_is_directory=True)
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members = [("link/evil.txt", b"escaped")]
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deb = tmp_path / f"escape-{shape}.deb"
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_build_deb(deb, members)
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with pytest.raises(InstallError, match="escape|unsafe|outside"):
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_P().unpack(deb, staged, "linux-arm64-bionic")
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assert sentinel.read_text() == "do not touch", (
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f"{shape}: a staged symlink was followed outside the tree"
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)
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assert os.stat(sentinel).st_mode & 0o777 == 0o600
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assert not (outside / "evil.txt").exists()
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